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We present an approach to type theory in which the typing judgments do not have explicit contexts.
Instead of judgments of shape Γ ` A : B, our systems just have judgments of shape A : B. A key
feature is that we distinguish free and bound variables even in pseudo-terms.
Specifically we give the rules of the ‘Pure Type System’ class of type theories in this style. We
prove that the typing judgments of these systems correspond in a natural way with those of Pure
Type Systems as traditionally formulated. I.e., our systems have exactly the same well-typed terms
as traditional presentations of type theory.
Our system can be seen as a type theory in which all type judgments share an identical, infinite,
typing context that has infinitely many variables for each possible type. For this reason we call our
system Γ∞. This name means to suggest that our type judgment A : B should be read as Γ∞ ` A : B,
with a fixed infinite type context called Γ∞.
1 Introduction
1.1 Problem
One of the important insights type theory gives us is the need to be aware of the context in which one
works. This was already stressed by de Bruijn in his 1979 paper Wees contextbewust in WOT [6], Dutch
for “Be context aware in the mathematical vernacular”. In type theory a term always is considered with
respect to a context Γ, which gives the types of the variables occurring free in the term. This is also
apparent in the shape Γ `M : A of the judgments of type theory, where the context Γ is made explicit.
Thus a ‘bound’ variable is bound locally in a term, while a ‘free’ variable actually is globally bound,
namely by the context.
In customary presentations of first order predicate logic [16, 22, for example], and in fact in the
presentation of most other logics as well, free variables are not treated in such a way. In these logics free
variables are really free. They are taken from an infinite supply of variables that are just available to be
used in formulas and terms, without them having to be declared first.
This difference between type theory and predicate logic means that when we model predicate logic
in type theory, actually we do not get the customary version of predicate logic, but instead get a version
called free logic [12]. In traditional treatments the formula (∀x.P(x))→ (∃x.P(x)) is usually provable.
For instance a natural deduction proof of this formula would look like:
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[∀x.P(x)]
P(y)
∀E
∃x.P(x) ∃I
(∀x.P(x))→ (∃x.P(x))→I
This proof uses the free variable y. If one cannot use any other variables than those introduced by earlier
rules, then this proof fails. Indeed, the type corresponding to the formula is not inhabited: there is no
term M such that the following judgment is derivable:
D : ∗, P : D→∗ `M : (Πx : D.P(x))→ (Σx : D.P(x))
because we cannot avoid the case in which the domain D is empty, where the formula is false.
Now there are two things one can do to bridge this gap between type theory and traditional logic:
• Make predicate logic more like type theory, by explicitly keeping track in the judgments of the set
of variables that can be used in the proof.
• Make type theory more like predicate logic, by having a version of type theory that does not need
contexts in the judgments, i.e., in which free variables are just taken from some infinite supply.
Although the first option is interesting too, especially in categorical treatments of logic [11, for example],
in this paper we focus on the second. We originally thought that the dependent types in type theory would
prevent a version of type theory without contexts from being a viable option, but to our surprise it turns
out that one can present type theory in a style where there are no contexts and in which therefore free
variables are really free, provided we are prepared to pay the small price of labelling variables in a rather
involved manner.
In those type theories actually implemented in interactive theorem provers, the context always con-
sists of a part holding global definitions and parameters and a part holding the free variables in the term
(as in [19, 21, for example]). For simplicity of exposition, and for the sake of proving an exact corre-
spondence between a standard presentation of type theory and the variant we propose, in this paper we
consider only the second part of such contexts. We believe, however, that the other part can be treated in
exactly the same way.
There is another reason why it is interesting to look at a version of type theory where there are no
explicit contexts. One of the most popular architectures for proof assistants is the LCF architecture,
named after the LCF system from the seventies [9]. In the original form of such a system there is an
abstract data type called term, whose elements can only be created by a small number of functions
exported from the type-checking kernel. Elements of this datatype always correspond to type-correct
terms, and those terms can contain free variables.
A system using this approach has a kernel interface containing a function:
app : term * term -> term
When this function is called, the kernel of the system makes sure that the types of the arguments are
compatible, i.e., that the result is again a type-correct term.
This is how the HOL family of theorem provers is implemented. These systems have a logical
foundation that is based on a typed lambda calculus. However, in these systems the free variables in
the terms are not recorded in a context of variables. The only context in these systems is the context
of definitions, which is kept track of in a stateful variable. Definitions are never allowed to be removed
from this context, as that would compromise the safety of the kernel. Hence, these systems are stateful,
although they can be made functional using a variant of the approach presented here [24].
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There are two classes of systems that can be said to implement a type theory, a typed lambda calculus:
• The simpler type theories, in which no dependent types are allowed. They often are a form of
simple type theory with some enhancements, such as some form of polymorphism or type classes.
These include the systems from the HOL family: HOL4, HOL Light, ProofPower and Isabelle.
These systems can be, and are, implemented following the LCF architecture just outlined. In these
systems variables come from an infinite ‘sea’ of free variables, and in the logical theory there is no
context keeping track of the variables.
• More advanced type theories, often called type theory with dependent types. These come from the
Dutch AUTOMATH systems, the Swedish tradition of Martin-Lo¨f type theory, the French tradition
of the Calculus of Constructions and variations on the Edinburgh Logical Framework. Their im-
plementations include Coq, NuPRL, Twelf, Agda, Lego, Plastic and Epigram. In the logical theory
of these systems there is a context keeping track of the variables.
For this second style of type theory the pure LCF approach is not attractive. The app function will need
to check whether the contexts in which the terms live are compatible, which will be very expensive, if it
needs to be done for the type-checking of each function application.
For this reason actual type-theoretical proof assistants have a kernel with a different kind of interface.
In such a kernel there is no abstract datatype of terms (there just is a—non-abstract—type of pseudo-
terms). Instead there is an abstract type of well-typed contexts, which we call context here. (There is
also a type pseudocontext, but that is irrelevant here.) The interface then looks like:
mkApp : pseudoterm * pseudoterm -> pseudoterm
add_constant : string * pseudoterm -> context -> context
where mkApp is just the constructor of the data type of pseudoterms, whereas add constant is a function
that does the type-checking: a pseudoterm will only be added to the context after it has been type-
checked. (These are the actual names of the functions in the kernel of the Coq system. The types of
those functions in Coq are essentially what is presented here. The type pseudoterm is called constr in
Coq, while the type context is called safe_environment.) The system also has a global variable
global_env : context ref
corresponding to the state of the system in which the user works. It is not part of the kernel (and in fact is
changed back by an undo operation), but as there are no interesting operations combining two different
contexts, only one global context is ever relevant, the one given by the contents of this variable.
Although the architecture with contexts that we described is purely functional (as is the Coq kernel),
the fact that the actual implementation has this global variable means that it is used in a rather ‘stateful’
way. The desire to investigate a possible LCF-style kernel for type theory that is ‘less stateful’ motivated
this research. In the conclusions we will address the question whether the style of type theory we present
here will lead to such a type-checking architecture.
1.2 Approach
The approach we will follow here is to imagine there to be an ‘infinite context’ called Γ∞. For each type-
correct type A this context will have infinitely many variables xAi . It should be stressed that this A should
be considered to just be a label, a string. Reduction will never happen inside these As. Also, xAi and x
B
i
will be different variables, even when A and B are convertible, or even if they are α-equivalent. Note that
the (free) variables in A themselves will also be of shape yBj : this means that the variables themselves, as
well as the terms, have a recursive tree-like structure.
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For example, a variable corresponding to the successor function on natural numbers looks like:
sN
∗→N∗
If we use numbered names for the variables, this might become:
xx
∗
0→x∗0
0
So the “small price” alluded to above is that a free variable xAi in a well-typed term carries with it the
(well-founded) history of how it comes to be well-typed; that is, the label A witnesses the validity of the
context extension Γ,xi : A.
Now our systems will have judgments A : B, which should be interpreted as Γ∞ ` A : B. For this
reason we call the general approach to type theory introduced here ‘Γ∞’ (reusing the name of the context
as the name of the system). Note that Γ∞ is not a single system: each type theory will have a ‘Γ∞-variant’.
The Γ∞ approach has the essential feature that there are two different classes of variables. There
are the variables that come from the Γ∞ context (the ‘free’ variables), and then there is another kind of
‘bound’ variables. When thinking about our systems one might imagine de Bruijn indices for the bound
variables, although the presentation we give here uses named variables for them as well.
Although we expect many type theories to have a Γ∞-variant, here we only consider the class of type
theories called Pure Type Systems [2] (PTSs). That way we keep everything concrete, and it allows us
to prove a precise correspondence between PTSs in the traditional style and our version in Γ∞ style.
One should note that in Γ∞ any type will be inhabited, simply because there are free variables of every
type: in particular, just as in traditional treatments of logic, all domains are assumed to be inhabited.
This is in essence the same as in the version with contexts, except that such variables are there explicitly
recorded in the context.
1.3 Related Work
To our surprise, we found little published work investigating such an approach to dependent type theory.
In Church’s original formulation of simple type theory [5], variables, both free and bound, are anno-
tated with their types, writing for example λxα . f α→α xα . (whereas in our formulation we would write
λx:α∗. f α∗→α∗ x.) Girard adopted ‘Church-style’ in the account of System F in his thesis [8]. In neither
system do term variables occur in types, while type variables are not regulated by an explicit context. In
these non-dependent type theories, contexts are not strictly needed, because one can define the different
syntactic classes — types, terms — in stages. One can regard our approach as extending that of Church
to dependent types, but optimised to avoid the need to consider substitution in labels on bound variables
which otherwise might arise in the application rule.
Conor McBride (private communication) observed that Pollack’s LEGO implementation already
supported the Γ∞ idea, and this idea was then used in his OLEG extensions, and subsequently in the
architecture of EPIGRAM 1. However, this approach has not been treated theoretically as we do here.
The explicit distinction between free and bound variables on a syntactic level already can be found in
[15]. The motivation there was to avoid capture during substitution while keeping a close correspondence
with the informal presentation of PTSs with named variables, rather than how to give a ‘Γ∞’ presentation,
as here. Various approaches to representing binding are discussed in [23], which considers named free
variables and de Bruijn index bound variables one of the best options for mechanisation. Indeed, in
ongoing work [10] the second author has formalised one half of the correspondence proved in Section 4
in such a style. We expand on the niceties of this formalisation in Section 5.
H. Geuvers, R. Krebbers, J. McKinna & F. Wiedijk 57
Elsewhere, Pollack considered presentations of type theory separating the typing judgment from that
for context well-formedness [17], although judgments are still ‘in context’. This allows a subtle range of
issues to be explored, especially regarding closure under α-conversion, here treated only informally.
Most significantly, but starting from a rather different point, Sacerdoti Coen considered the problem
of proof-checking in the setting of a distributed library, and hence the problem of how to reconstruct a
context in which a given term may be successfully type-checked [19]. This work (elaborated in [18], and
forming the basis of the Matita system) goes beyond the standard PTS setting considered in this paper.
It identifies a subtle problem which arises when attempting to merge contexts (including definitions) in
the presence of global constraints (such as universe levels).
Added in proof. Between acceptance of the final version of this paper and this final version, our
attention was drawn to the recent work of Matthias Boespflug [4], which itself references an earlier
(2009) account of our ideas. By contrast with our presentation, which is purely first-order, Boespflug
uses higher-order abstract syntax (HOAS), with a view to implementation.
1.4 Contribution
We present a different approach to type theory, much closer to the way logical systems usually are
presented than the standard presentation, in which free variables are not bound in a finite context but are
taken to be really free.
We validate our approach by proving two theorems, 13 and 19 below, establishing a straightforward
correspondence between the standard presentation and the variant presented here.
1.5 Outline
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we recall the PTS rules and some of its theory. In
Section 3 we present the Γ∞-variant of the PTS rules, in which the judgments do not have contexts. In
Section 4 we show that both systems correspond to each other in a natural way. In Section 5 we conclude
with a prospectus for an implementation based on our variant of the PTS rules.
2 Pure Type Systems in the traditional style
Pure Type Systems (PTSs) generalize many existing type systems and thus the class of PTSs contains
various well-known systems, like systems F and Fω , dependent type theory λP and the Calculus of
Constructions.
Definition 1. For S a set (the set of sorts), A ⊆S ×S (the set of axioms) and R ⊆S ×S ×S
(the set of rules), the Pure Type System λ (S ,A ,R) is the typed λ -calculus with inference rules as in
Figure 1. In the rules, the expressions M,N,A,B,C are taken from the set of pseudo-terms T defined by
T ::= s | V |ΠV :T .T | λV :T .T |T T .
with V a set of variables, and the Γ taken from the set of pseudo-contexts
x1 : A1, . . . ,xn : An (xi ∈ V ,Ai ∈T ,1≤ i≤ n)
with the xi all distinct. (We leave the choice of variable names unspecified at this point, as this does not
matter as long as V is countably infinite, but below we will take a specific choice of names.)
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(sort) ` s1 : s2 if (s1,s2) ∈A
(var)
Γ ` A : s
Γ,x:A ` x : A if x /∈ Γ
(weak)
Γ ` A : s Γ `M : C
Γ,x:A `M : C if x /∈ Γ
(Π)
Γ ` A : s1 Γ,x:A ` B : s2
Γ `Πx:A.B : s3
if (s1,s2,s3) ∈R
(λ )
Γ,x:A `M : B Γ `Πx:A.B : s
Γ ` λx:A.M : Πx:A.B
(app)
Γ `M : Πx:A.B Γ ` N : A
Γ `MN : B[x := N]
(conv)
Γ `M : A Γ ` B : s
Γ `M : B
A =β B
Figure 1: Typing rules for PTSs
There is a lot of theory about PTSs and various systems have been studied in the context of PTSs.
We do not give a complete overview but refer to [2, 3, 7] for details and explanation. Here we just give
the results that we use in the rest of the paper to prove the equivalence between a PTS and its Γ∞-variant.
Definition 2. The pseudo-term A is called well-typed if a pseudo-context Γ and pseudo-term B exist such
that Γ ` A : B or Γ ` B : A is derivable. A pseudo-context Γ is well-formed if pseudo-terms A and B exist
such that Γ ` A : B is derivable; a context is a well-formed pseudo-context. The set of variables declared
in pseudo-context Γ is called the domain of Γ, dom(Γ). For x ∈ dom(Γ), let typeΓ(x) denote the ‘type’
assigned to x in Γ: if x : A ∈ Γ, then typeΓ(x) = A. The expression type(Γ) denotes the set of such ‘types’
occurring in Γ. The set of well-typed terms of λ (S ,A ,R) is denoted by Term(λ (S ,A ,R)).
We adopt the usual notions of bound and free variable, α-conversion (≡), substitution (B[x := N],
used in the rule (app)), β -reduction (→β ) and β -equality (=β , used in the rule (conv)) on pseudo-terms.
The following are well-known properties of PTSs. The relation Γ ⊆ ∆ denotes inclusion between Γ
and ∆ regarded as sets of variable assignments. The third, Permutation, is a corollary of Strengthening.
Proposition 3.
Thinning If Γ `M : A and ∆⊇ Γ is well-formed, then ∆ `M : A.
Strengthening If Γ,x : B,∆ `M : A and x /∈ FV(type(∆),M,A), then Γ,∆ `M : A.
Permutation If Γ,x : B,y : C,∆ `M : A and x /∈ FV(C), then Γ,y : C,x : B,∆ `M : A.
In proving the equivalence between a PTS and its Γ∞-variant, we need to merge two contexts to
create a new one. Therefore we introduce the following:
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Definition 4. Let Γ and ∆ be two pseudo-contexts. We say Γ and ∆ are compatible, notation Γ ||| ∆, if
∀x ∈ dom(Γ)∩dom(∆)(typeΓ(x)≡ type∆(x)).
The merge of Γ and ∆, notation Γn ∆, is the pseudo-context Γ,(∆ \ Γ). This is Γ followed by the
declarations x : B ∈ ∆ for which x /∈ dom(Γ).
Note the strong requirement in Γ ||| ∆ that the types of x in Γ and ∆ should be α-equal, and not just
β -convertible.
Lemma 5. If Γ and ∆ are contexts and Γ ||| ∆, then Γn∆ is well-formed.
Proof. We write x1 : B1, . . . ,xn : Bn for ∆. Γn∆ is the pseudo-context Γ,(∆ \Γ). As Γ is well-formed,
we only have to consider the part ∆ \Γ = xi1 : Bi1 , . . . ,xin : Bin . But x1 : B1, . . . ,xi1−1 : Bi1−1 ⊆ Γ, so by
Thinning Γ ` Bi1 : s for some sort s, so Γ,xi1 : Bi1 is well-formed.
The same reasoning applies to xi2 : Bi2 , . . . ,xin : Bin , so we conclude that Γ,(∆\Γ) is well-formed.
In our system Γ∞, the free variables will have special names, as they are labelled by their types. Of
course, consistently renaming the free variables in a judgment Γ `M : A does not change its meaning, as
the free variables in M and A are actually bound in Γ. For clarity, we introduce this notion explicitly.
Definition 6. The judgment Γ `M : A is α-equivalent to Γ′ `M′ : A′ in case one can be obtained from
the other by renaming bound variables, where we consider the free variables in M and A to be bound by
their declaration in Γ.
3 Pure Type Systems in the Γ∞ style
We now make the set of variables V explicit. We have two kinds: variables x˙ with a dot on top, intended
to be bound by λ and Π binders; and variables xA tagged with a pseudo-term A, intended to be bound in
the context. This means we take V in Definition 1 as follows, whereX supplies the names of variables:
V ::= X˙ |X T
X ::= x | y | z | . . . | x0 | x1 | x2 | . . .
Clearly the rules for T and V are mutually recursive.
Note that although the variables are intended to be used in a certain way (made precise in Defini-
tion 10 below), in the PTSs as defined above both kinds of V can be used for all purposes. In particular
x˙ can be put in a context, xA can be bound, and the label A of xA need not correspond to the type of xA.
Note also that the definition of substitution, and hence the relation of β -equality, is agnostic about
the structure of the annotations of the variables. (The definition of =β in Section 2 takes V just as a set).
This means that although
(λ A˙ : ∗.A˙)B∗ =β B∗
we have that
x(λ A˙:∗.A˙)B
∗ 6=β xB
∗
We will now define the rules of Γ∞. To do this we first have to introduce the notion of hereditarily
free variables of the types of the free variables in a term. We first motivate the need for this notion.
In a PTS, the context takes care that one can only abstract over a variable if nothing else depends on
that variable. In the rules, this is formalised by requiring that the x : A abstracted over in the Π or λ rule
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must be the last declaration in the context. This ensures that x does not occur free in any of the other
types in the context. In Γ∞ we do not have contexts, so we have to replace this by another side condition
on the rules. We would like to have a Π rule as follows:
A : s1 B : s2
Πy˙:A.B[xA := y˙] : s3
(s1,s2,s3) ∈R
but that is wrong, because then we would be able to form (in PTS terminology) the Π-type
. . . ` A : ∗ A : ∗,P : A→∗,Q : Πx:A.Px→∗,a : A,h : Pa ` Qah : ∗
A : ∗,P : A→∗,Q : Πx:A.Px→∗,h : Pa `Πy : A.Qyh : ∗
But this cannot be correct, because h is not of type Py in the conclusion. In Γ∞, this derivation would
read (adding some brackets for readability):
A∗ : ∗ QΠx˙:A∗.(PA∗→∗ x˙)→∗ aA∗ hPA∗→∗ aA∗ : ∗
Πy˙ : A∗.QΠx˙:A∗.(PA
∗→∗ x˙)→∗ y˙ hPA
∗→∗ aA∗ : ∗
which would be derivable according to the Π-rule above, but clearly undesirable.
Definition 7. Given M ∈T , we define the hereditarily free variables in M, denoted hfv(M), as follows:
hfv(s) = hfv(x˙) = /0
hfv(xA) = {xA}∪hfv(A)
hfv(F N) = hfv(F)∪hfv(N)
hfv(λ x˙:A.N) = hfv(Πx˙:A.N) = hfv(A)∪hfv(N)
So, where =β basically ignores the structure of the type labels of free variables, we now take them
seriously, collecting the variables (hereditarily) free in the type labels as well.
We put as a side condition in the Π-rule that xA should not occur free in any of the types of the free
variables in B, and similarly for the λ rule. We give an explicit definition of this notion.
Definition 8. Given M ∈T , we define the hereditarily free variables of the types of the free variables in
M, denoted hfvT(M), as follows:
hfvT(s) = hfvT(x˙) = /0
hfvT(xA) = hfv(A)
hfvT(F N) = hfvT(F)∪hfvT(N)
hfvT(λ x˙:A.N) = hfvT(Πx˙:A.N) = hfvT(A)∪hfvT(N)
So, for example hfvT(hP
A∗→∗ aA∗ ) = {PA∗→∗,aA∗ ,A∗}. An easy corollary of the definition is that
hfvT(M)⊆ hfv(M)
We now give the derivation rules of the system.
Definition 9. The derivation rules of Γ∞ are given by the inference rules in Figure 2. The Π and λ rules
have the side condition that x˙ should not be captured in B or M when doing the substitution. That is, x˙
should not be bound by a binder under which yA occurs.
The side condition on the Π and λ rules is no restriction as you can go to an α-equivalent version of
the term afterwards.
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(sort) s1 : s2
if (s1,s2) ∈A
(var)
A : s
xA : A
(Π)
A : s1 B : s2
Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙] : s3
if (s1,s2,s3) ∈R and yA /∈ hfvT(B)
(λ )
M : B Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙] : s
λ x˙:A.M[yA := x˙] : Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙]
if yA /∈ hfvT(M)∪hfvT(B)
(app)
M : Πx˙:A.B N : A
MN : B[x˙ := N]
(conv)
M : A B : s
M : B
A =β B
Figure 2: Typing rules for Γ∞
4 The correspondence theorems
We now prove that a PTS and its Γ∞-variant correspond to each other. For a Γ∞ judgment M : A we
generate a context Γ such that Γ `M : A is PTS-derivable. Conversely, if Γ `M : A is PTS-derivable, we
always have an α-equivalent judgment (see Definition 6) Γ′ `M′ : A′ such that M′ : A′ is derivable in Γ∞.
This specific form Γ′ `M′ : A′ we call a type annotated judgment.
Definition 10. A type annotated context in a PTS is a context of the form
xB11 : B1, . . . ,x
Bn
n : Bn
where we moreover assume that all bound variables in the Bi are of the form x˙.
Definition 11. A type annotated judgment in a PTS is one of the form
xB11 : B1, . . . ,x
Bn
n : Bn `M : A
where: xB11 : B1, . . . ,x
Bn
n : Bn is a type annotated context; all free variables in M and A are of the form x
Bi
i ;
and all bound variables are of the form x˙.
We now first show the easy direction of our correspondence result:
Lemma 12. Every judgment Γ`M : A in a PTS is α-equivalent to a type annotated judgment Γ′ `M′ : A′.
Proof. From left to right we rename the variables in the context (and of course also in M and A) to the
‘standard’ names
xB11 : Bn, . . . ,x
Bn
n : Bn
(Here xi is not a meta-variable for a variable name, but really the explicit variable name “xi” inX .) We
also α-rename any bound variable of the form xA to a fresh variable of the form x˙.
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As an example, consider the PTS judgment
A : ∗, a : A ` (λx:A.x)a : A
This does not fit the variable names from our V , so this does not conform to the definitions in this paper.
Instead using our variables it should be something like:
A˙ : ∗, a∗ : A˙ ` (λxB˙:A˙.xB˙)a∗ : A˙
This of course is not a type annotated judgment, the annotations make no sense at all, but still this is a
perfectly fine PTS judgment as defined in Definition 1.
Now according to the theorem this is α-equivalent to a judgment that is type annotated. And it is, for
example it is α-equivalent to
x∗1 : ∗, xx
∗
1
2 : x
∗
1 ` (λ x˙:x∗1. x˙)xx
∗
1
2
Or, if one uses more readable names, to
A∗ : ∗, aA∗ : A∗ ` (λ x˙:A∗. x˙)aA∗
The other part of the easy direction of our correspondence is that a type annotated PTS judgment
essentially is the same as a Γ∞ judgment:
Theorem 13. If the type annotated PTS judgment Γ ` M : A is derivable, then M : A is a derivable
judgment of the corresponding Γ∞ type theory.
Proof. By induction on the size of the derivation of Γ `M : A. We do a case split on the last rule used in
the derivation:
(sort) Immediate.
(weak) Trivial, because if Γ,x:A is a type annotated context, then certainly Γ is a type annotated context.
(var) By induction we have A : s derivable in Γ∞, and because the context is type annotated the variable
name must be of the form xA. Hence xA : A in Γ∞.
(conv) We know that Γ ` M : A and Γ ` B : s. Now A need not have bound variables of the form x˙, but
one can rename them to obtain A′ ≡ A such that Γ `M : A′ will be type annotated. Then M : A′ and
B : s in Γ∞ by induction and therefore also M : B in Γ∞.
(app) Again, we might need to change the bound variable in Γ `M : Πx:A.B to the dotted kind, to get a
type annotated judgment. Apart from that this case is trivial, just like the previous one.
(Π) The conclusion will be of the form Γ `Πx˙:A.B : s3. Now if we take yA a completely fresh variable,
then Γ,yA : A ` B[x˙ := yA] : s2 will be a type annotated judgment, as well as being α-equivalent to
Γ, x˙ : A ` B : s2. Accordingly, let B′ := B[x˙ := yA], so that B≡ B′[yA := x˙].
Clearly now yA /∈ hfvT(B′) because Γ,yA : A ` B′ : s2, so all type annotations will be typable in Γ,
which does not contain yA.
By induction A : s1 and B′ : s2 in Γ∞ and because yA /∈ hfvT(B′) we get that Πx˙:A.B′[yA := x˙] : s3
in Γ∞. But this is precisely Πx˙:A.B : s3.
(λ ) This case essentially follows that of the previous one.
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The other direction of our correspondence—from Γ∞ to traditional PTS style—is a bit more involved.
We need to synthesise an appropriate context, and because we build this context by recursion over the
type derivation, we need to merge these synthesised contexts using n. For this we need a number of
lemmas involving type annotated contexts in PTSs.
Lemma 14. If Γ and ∆ are type annotated contexts, then Γ ||| ∆.
Proof. If xA ∈ dom(Γ)∩ dom(∆), then xA : A ∈ Γ and xA : A ∈ ∆, of course, A ≡ A and this is what we
need to prove according to Definition 4.
Lemma 15. If Γ is a type annotated context with xA ∈ dom(Γ), Γ `M : B and xA /∈ hfvT(M,B), then
∃∆⊂ Γ(∆,xA : A `M : B)
Proof. Write Γ = Γ1,xA : A,Γ2, and suppose yC ∈ dom(Γ2) with xA ∈ FV(C). If yC ∈ FV(M,B), then
xA ∈ hfvT(M,B), contradiction. So yC /∈ FV(M,B). This means that all declarations yC :C in Γ2 for which
xA ∈ FV(C) can be removed by Strengthening (Proposition 3), starting from the rightmost declaration in
Γ2. We end up with a judgment
Γ1,xA : A,Γ′2 `M : B
with Γ′2 ⊆ Γ2 and xA /∈ type(Γ′2). Using Permutation (Proposition 3), we conclude that Γ1,Γ′2,xA : A `
M : B and we take Γ1,Γ′2 for ∆.
Corollary 16. If Γ ` M : B is a type annotated judgment, there is a ∆ ⊆ Γ such that ∆ ` M : A and
dom(∆)⊆ hfv(M,B).
Proof. Let xA ∈ dom(Γ) and xA /∈ hfv(M,B). Then xA /∈ hfvT(M,B), so (according to Lemma 15), there
is a ∆ ⊆ Γ such that ∆,xA : A ` M : B. But also xA /∈ FV(M,B), so by Strengthening (Proposition 3),
∆ `M : B.
So, in Γ ` M : B, we can always make the context Γ so small that its domain is within the set of
hereditarily free variables of M,B. The other way around, the hereditarily free variables of M,B should
be in dom(Γ):
Lemma 17. If Γ `M : B is type annotated, then hfv(M,B)⊆ dom(Γ).
Proof. We prove Γ `M : B⇒ hfv(M) ⊆ dom(Γ), by induction on the derivation and then we are done,
because if Γ `M : B, then Γ ` B : s for some sort s, or B is a sort.
(sort) Immediate.
(var) By induction, hfv(A)⊆ dom(Γ), so hfv(xA)⊆ dom(Γ,xA : A).
(conv) By induction, hfv(M)⊆ dom(Γ), so we are done.
(app) By induction, hfv(F)⊆ dom(Γ) and hfv(M)⊆ dom(Γ), so hfv(F M)⊆ dom(Γ).
(Π) By induction, hfv(A)⊆ dom(Γ) and hfv(B)⊆ dom(Γ,yA : A), so hfv(Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙])⊆ dom(Γ).
(λ ) By induction, hfv(M)⊆ dom(Γ,yA : A) and hfv(Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙])⊆ dom(Γ), so hfv(A)⊂ dom(Γ),
and hence hfv(λ x˙:A.M[yA := x˙])⊆ dom(Γ).
The more difficult direction of our correspondence now follows:
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Lemma 18. Let M : A be a derivable Γ∞ judgment. Then all free variables in M and A have the form xA
and all bound variables have the form x˙.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of M : A.
Theorem 19. Let M : A be a derivable Γ∞ judgment. Then there is a type annotated judgment Γ `M : A
derivable in the associated PTS, such that Γ contains exactly the variables in hfv(M)∪hfv(A).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of M : A we show there exists a type annotated context Γ(M,A)
such that Γ(M,A) `M : A. Note that Γ(M,A) depends on the derivation of the judgment M : A, not just
on the terms M and A.
(sort) Immediate.
(var) By induction, Γ(A,s) ` A : s. So Γ(A,s),xA : A ` xA : A.
(conv) By induction, Γ(M,A) `M : A and Γ(B,s) ` B : s, and we also know that A =β B.
So Γ(M,A)nΓ(B,s) `M : B by Thinning and the (conv) rule.
(app) By induction, Γ(F,Πx˙:A.B) ` F : Πx˙:A.B and Γ(M,A) `M : A.
So Γ(F,Πx˙:A.B)nΓ(M,A) ` F M : B[x˙ := M] by Thinning and the (app) rule.
(Π) By induction, Γ(A,s1) ` A : s1 and Γ(B,s2) ` B : s2.
If yA /∈ Γ(B,s2), then Γ(A,s1)nΓ(B,s2),yA : Ai ` B : s2, so by Thinning and the (Π) rule we have
Γ(A,s1)nΓ(B,s2) `Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙] : s3.
If yA ∈ dom(Γ(B,s2)), then ∆,yA : A ` B : s2 for some ∆ ⊂ Γ(B,s2). So by Thinning and the (Π)
rule we have Γ(A,s1)n∆ `Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙] : s3.
(λ ) By induction, we obtain Γ(M,B) `M : B and Γ(Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙],s) `Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙] : s.
If yA /∈ dom(Γ(M,B)), then Γ(A,s1)nΓ(M,B),yA : Ai `M : B. So by Thinning and the (λ ) rule,
we have Γ(Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙],s)nΓ(M,B) ` λ x˙:A.M[yA := x˙] : Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙].
If yA ∈ dom(Γ(M,B)), then ∆,yA : A `M : B for some ∆⊂ Γ(M,B), by Lemma 15. So by Thinning
and the (λ ) rule, we have Γ(Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙],s)n∆ ` λ x˙:A.M[yA := x˙] : Πx˙:A.B[yA := x˙].
By Lemma 17, dom(Γ(M,A)) ⊇ hfv(M,A). Corollary 16 lets us strengthen the context to ∆ ⊆ Γ(M,A)
such that ∆ `M : A and dom(∆) = hfv(M,A).
Corollary 20. Let
M : A
be a derivable Γ∞ judgment. Take all variables of the form xAi occurring in hfv(M)∪ hfv(A), and put
them in any order xA1i1 , . . . ,x
An
in such that if x
Ak
ik occurs in Al then k < l. Then the following judgment is
derivable in the PTS:
xA1i1 : A1, . . . ,x
An
in : An `M : A
Proof. From the previous Theorem using Permutation.
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5 Conclusion and Further work
There are three obvious continuations of this work:
1. The first is to investigate to what extent other type theories than the PTSs admit a Γ∞ presentation.
2. The second is to see how well the approach presented here can be used as a basis of an LCF-style
kernel for type theory.
3. The third is to formally develop the theory presented in this paper in a proof assistant.
With respect to the first point: we expect most type theories to have a Γ∞-variant, although the obser-
vations about universe inconsistency [19] arising from merging contexts may complicate the picture for
applied type systems such as that of Coq. More important is to investigate how our approach needs to be
adapted to support type theories with definitions. As previously noted, in any real implementation, the
definitions for defined constants form a more significant part of the contexts Γ we are eliminating than
the free variables.
We are currently investigating the second point, developing an OCaml implementation for the PTS
λP extended with definitions (a system corresponding to the logical framework LF) along the lines of
this paper. The main question is how expensive, computationally, the two following operations are:
• The substitutions [yA := x˙] that occur in the λ and Π rules.
• The check of the side-condition yA /∈ hfvT(M,B) in the λ and Π rules.
The first is in some sense ‘local’, because it does not look inside constant definitions in the environment.
To make the second reasonably efficient will be harder. It is possible we need to consider three kinds
of variables, distinguishing (1) x˙ bound variables, (2) yA variables to be substituted with bound variables
later (essentially, the eigenvariables of the (Π) and (λ ) rules), and (3) xA variables that do remain free,
so they may be considered as ‘axiomatic constants’ of the system.
In such a system, it is essential that the implementation language can use pointer equality to effi-
ciently determine equality of terms (and in particular, equality of annotations in variable occurrences).
This motivated our choice of OCaml, which is such a language. Although in OCaml the comparison
function “=” does not have this feature (because floating points NaNs are not taken to be equal to them-
selves, the system never looks at pointer equality when evaluating “x = y”), the comparison function
“fun x y -> Pervasives.compare x y = 0” does.
We are currently working on the third point as well. In ongoing work [10] the second author has
formalised a large part of the theory presented in this paper up to the first direction of the correspondence
theorem in the proof assistant Coq. However, the presentation in this formal development is slightly
different from that of this paper.
• Firstly, we distinguish bound from free variables at the level of PTS pseudo-terms, following
existing practice, established since the third author’s work with Pollack in the 1990s [14, 15].
Our informal presentation above uses named variables in each case, the so-called locally named
approach, whereas the formalisation uses the locally nameless representation: de Bruijn indices
for bound variables and names for free variables. Because we make this difference at the level of
PTS pseudo-terms already, we have a canonical representative for each term and therefore need
not worry about α-equivalence. For further details of both approaches, see [15, 1, for example].
• Secondly, variable binding in the (Π) and (λ ) rules of Γ∞ is handled by substituting free variables
for bound variables, rather than bound for free as in Section 3. This choice has been used success-
fully in other formalisations (ibid.), and emphasises the conceptual priority of free variables over
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bound. Recent work by Pollack and Sato compares the two approaches, in a detailed account of
canonical representation for languages with binding [20].
Based on the methodology described in [1], we have combined the locally nameless presentation with
co-finite quantification to obtain strong induction principles. To be sure that our co-finite presentation is
adequate we have proved it to be equivalent to an exists-fresh presentation.
For example the (Π) rule, in respectively exists-fresh and co-finite presentation, is as follows.
(Π exists-fresh)
A : s1 B[0 := xA] : s2
ΠA.B : s3
if (s1,s2,s3) ∈R and xA /∈ hfv(B)
(Π co-finite)
A : s1 ∀x /∈ L . B[0 := xA] : s2
ΠA.B : s3
if (s1,s2,s3) ∈R and L⊂finite V
Observe that we require xA /∈ hfv(B) instead of xA /∈ hfvT(B) (this was also observed by John Boyland).
The reason for this is that we have to bind every occurrence of the free variable xA in B[0 := xA], hence xA
should not be in FV(B) either. While the condition is (potentially) more expensive to check, it removes
the need for Definition 8, in favour of the (conceptually) simpler Definition 7.
The other direction of the correspondence theorem uses the second property, Strengthening, of Propo-
sition 3 in an essential way. This presents two difficulties: a practical one, since the existing formalisa-
tions of this lemma are highly non-trivial [15]; and a theoretical one, namely that we may not be able to
establish a correspondence between traditional and Γ∞ presentations of a given type theory without first
establishing strengthening.
More interestingly, from the point of view of the pragmatics of formalisation, for this direction it is
essential to abstract over the kinds of free variables used in the definition of PTS judgments. At first
this does not seem troublesome, however, many definitions and theorems do not just depend on the kind
of free variables but also on finite sets of free variables. Hence we are also required to abstract over
various operations on such finite sets. The recently developed finite set library [13], based on the new
type classes feature in Coq, might be very useful in implementing this abstraction.
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